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Abstract
The empirical distinction between de facto and de jure exchange
rate regimes raises a number of interesting questions. Which factors
may induce a de facto peg? Why do countries enforce a peg but do
not announce it? Why do countries \break their promises"? We show
that a stable socio-political and an e±cient political decision-making
process are a necessary prerequisite for choosing a peg and sticking to
it, challenging the view that sees the exchange rate as a commitment
device. Policymakers seem rather concerned with regime sustainability
in the face of adverse economic and socio political fundamentals.
JEL: F310, D720
¤The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily re°ect the position of
the Economic Commission for Europe or any other United Nations agency. Emilio Colombo
and Patrizio Tirelli gratefully acknowledge ¯nancial support from MIUR (PRIN 2004-05)
yCorresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Milan Bicocca, Piazza
dell'Ateneo Nuovo 1 (U6/329), 20126 Milan, Italy. E-mail: emilio.colombo@unimib.it
11 Introduction
What was critical for the maintenance of pegged exchange rates,
was protection for governments from pressure to trade exchange
rate stability for other goals. Under the nineteenth-century gold
standard the source of such protection was insulation from domestic
politics. The pressure brought to bear on twentieth-century gov-
ernments to subordinate currency stability to other objectives was
not a feature of the nineteenth-century world. Because the right
to vote was limited, the common labourers who su®ered most from
hard times were poorly positioned to object to increases in central
bank interest rates adopted to defend the currency peg. Neither
trade union nor parliamentary labour parties had developed to the
point where workers could insist that defense of the exchange rate
be tempered by the pursuit of other objectives (Eichengreen, 1998).
Few issues are more controversial in international economics than the choice
of the exchange rate regime. Ever since the demise of the Bretton Woods
system, economists have disagreed over the relative merits of ¯xed and °exible
exchange rates. In the profession and among laymen, the consensus shifted
from the \naive" enthusiasm for °exible exchange rates in the late sixties,
to the preference for ¯xed rates in the early eighties and for intermediate
regimes in the early nineties. After the Asian crisis the consensus changed again
embracing the bipolar view of exchange rate regimes1 i.e. either irrevocably
¯xed rates (currency board, dollarisation) or truly °exible rates.
The empirical evidence presented in the seminal contribution of Calvo and
Reinhart (2002) challenged this view, suggesting that many countries follow
de facto a regime which is di®erent from what o±cially declared. On the one
hand, pegs are often announced but not implemented in practice. On the other
hand, several countries seem to \fear of °oating" adopting de facto a peg (or a
regime close to it) while o±cially declaring a °oat.2 The empirical distinction
between de jure and de facto regimes raises a number of interesting questions.
Which factors may induce a de facto peg? Why do countries enforce a peg
but do not announce it? Why do countries \break their promises"? Is there
a di®erence between countries that renege on a peg and those that \fear of
°oating"?
In our view, an answer to these questions is to be found by looking at
the double-edged incentives behind the adoption of an exchange rate regime.
1See Fischer (2001).
2See also Hausmann et al. (2001).
2Models in the Barro-Gordon tradition, that we label as credibility view, sug-
gest that signalling commitment to tough policies is relatively more desirable
when the potential in°ation bias is more severe. Unfortunately, such tough
policies may back¯re. In fact, resisting a devaluation under adverse economic
circumstances may raise the incentives to devalue in the future, harming the
credibility of the peg and hence triggering speculative attacks (Bartolini and
Drazen, 1997; Drazen, 1997; Drazen and Masson, 1994). As shown in Ve-
lasco and Neut (2004), tough policies may indeed raise in°ation expectations.
According to this alternative approach, consistency with the underlying fun-
damentals is required to ensure the sustainability of the exchange rate regime.
Thus the consistency view calls for retaining the option of °exibility when the
potential in°ation bias is stronger.
Our work provides a number of contributions to the existing literature.
First, we go beyond the standard de jure and de facto dichotomy and analyse
a taxonomy of regimes (de jure-non-de facto pegs, de facto-non-de jure pegs,
de facto-de jure pegs, fear of °oating etc.). This allows us to identify the deter-
minants of speci¯c regime choices and the value of breaking certain \promises".
Second, by explicitly focusing on the credibility-vs-consistency dilemma, we
are able to represent and interpret several economic and political factors which
may constrain the policymaker's actions. Among these, political variables play
a key role. We consider three channels that link politics to the choice of the
exchange rate regime: (i) the electoral cycle, (ii) government termination and
socio-political unrest, (iii) institutional arrangements concerning the decision-
making process. Other contributions focused on broad dimensions such as the
level of democracy (Leblang, 1999), the transparency of the political process
(Broz, 2002), the quality of institutions and governance indicators (Alesina and
Wagner, 2003). We prefer to focus on factors which are more closely related to
the macroeconomic policy stance and to the choice of the exchange rate regime.
To our knowledge, ours is the ¯rst systematic and comprehensive assessment
of the role played by political variables in exchange rate regime choice.3
Third, we generalise, integrate and expand existing results by estimat-
ing a rich model speci¯cation on a large data-set of developing and advanced
economies spanning from 1974 to 2000.
Our results strongly favour the consistency view. Indicators of sociopolit-
ical risk and political fragmentation are positively related to the chances of
observing a de facto °oat. Moreover, whenever a country is already de facto
implementing a peg, the same factors makes it more likely that the peg will
also be announced. The same result holds for indicators of ¯nancial fragility;
3Our work di®ers from and complements Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004), who test di®erent
theories of regime choice.
3for instance countries heavily indebted in foreign currency are more likely to
de facto peg and less likely to publicly announce it. Finally, in line with the
predictions of the consistency view, we ¯nd that socio-political unrest and po-
litical fragmentation increase the chances that a promise to implement a peg
will be broken.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses
the channels underlying the two views. Section 3 describes the data set and
the econometric methodology employed. Section 4 summarises the empirical
results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Competing views on regime choice determi-
nants
During the last decades the literature has produced several theories which
generally do not distinguish between de jure and de facto regimes. Early
work on optimal currency areas (Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Ke-
nen (1969)) points to a country's degree of international openness and the
symmetry of shocks vis-µ a-vis the partner(s) as the conditions that maximise
the bene¯ts from pegging. The traditional Mundell-Fleming-Poole model in-
dicates the nominal-vs-real shocks dichotomy as the main determinant of the
regime choice. More recently several authors (Eichengreen, 2001; Chang and
Velasco, 1999; Aghion et al., 2003) argued that capital °ows and balance sheet
e®ects are one of the key determinants that drive a country's choice of ex-
change rate regime. Finally the Barro-Gordon argument emphasises the role
of the exchange rate as a commitment device (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988).
In this vein the sustainability of the peg is determined by the policymaker's
preferences and by the costs of reversing to discretionary regimes. In contrast
to this view, a number of contributions argue that the credibility of announced
policies crucially depends on the economic and socio- political environment
(Bartolini and Drazen, 1997; Drazen, 1997; Drazen and Masson, 1994; Velasco
and Neut, 2004). Under unfavourable circumstances even an in°ation averse
policymaker may want to devalue; thus the perceived chances of a devaluation
may increase if a tough policy today worsens the trade-o® between credibility
and °exibility tomorrow, possibly due to a persistent unemployment increase
or to debt accumulation.
We investigate this fundamental controversy about the choice of the ex-
change rate regime. On the one hand, the regime should be consistent with
the underlying economic and political conditions. We label this approach as
consistency view. On the other hand, the regime should be exploited to impose
4\invisible handcu®s" on the policymaker, tying his actions to a speci¯c policy
course. This approach, that we call credibility view, implies that the exchange
rate regime is an instrument for governments to address credibility-de¯cits and
dynamic inconsistency problems. Since they start from fundamentally di®erent
standpoints, the two views lead to substantially con°icting predictions about
the e®ect of economic and political factors on the regime choice. The pur-
pose of this section is to review those predictions and the associated existing
empirical evidence.
In the following we present both political channels and economic channels
that are suited for this dual interpretation. There are of course other eco-
nomic factors that a®ect the exchange rate regime choice and which must be
controlled for in the econometric analysis. They will be presented in section 3.
2.1 Economic channels
Liability dollarisation. Several recent contributions (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002;
Hausmann et al., 2001; Aghion et al., 2003) have stressed the role of balance
sheet e®ects on the choice of the exchange rate regime. The credibility view
claims that liability dollarisation strengthens an announced peg by raising the
cost of reneging on it. The consistency view reverses this argument, as the com-
bination of liability dollarisation and exchange rate commitment generates lock
in e®ects (Velasco and Neut, 2004). Therefore, when adverse shocks render the
peg unsustainable, the delayed devaluation is ampli¯ed and may cause a ¯nan-
cial meltdown.4 Moreover an announced peg could worsen ¯nancial fragility as
the implicit insurance o®ered against exchange rate °uctuations could induce
domestic agents to increase their share of foreign-currency denominated lia-
bilities (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999). The consistency view also argues
that countries with high liability dollarisation should be wary of a free °oat,
as exchange rate volatility could exacerbate domestic ¯nancial fragility. For
our purposes empirical research provides only preliminary evidence: Alesina
and Wagner (2003); Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004); Poirson (2001) ¯nd that lia-
bility dollarisation is associated with de facto pegs, but does not investigate
whether liability dollarisation a®ects the probability that de facto pegs are also
announced.
In°ation. The credibility view emphasises the role of the exchange rate as
a nominal anchor, particularly in countries where monetary institutions are
weak. In this vein, ¯xed exchange rates should be adopted when persistently
high rates of in°ation erode the credibility of the monetary authority and alter-
4In this regard the Argentinian case is paradigmatic.
5native stabilisation rules become unmanageable. 5 By contrast the consistency
view argues that high in°ation countries should be careful in adopting a peg as
the erosion of external competitiveness would eventually undermine the sus-
tainability, and hence credibility, of the peg.6 The empirical evidence is mixed:
Poirson (2001) supports the credibility model ¯nding a positive relationship
between in°ation and ¯xed exchange rates.7 Rizzo (1998) ¯nds instead that
countries with lower in°ation are more likely to adopt ¯xed exchange rates.
2.2 Political channels
We consider three channels that link politics to the choice of the exchange rate
regime: (i) the electoral cycle, (ii) government termination and socio-political
unrest, (iii) institutional arrangements concerning the decision-making process.
In all these cases the familiar credibility vs consistency dilemma arises as polit-
ical incentives make it more di±cult to implement and sustain \tough" mone-
tary policies. On the one hand, a peg should tie the hands of the policymaker
and discipline political pressures. On the other hand, political weakness could
undermine the credibility of a peg under adverse circumstances.
Electoral cycle. Alesina et al. (1997) and Drazen (2000) point out that by
\tying monetary policy to the mast" (Agell et al., 1996) in electoral years,
governments can signal their competence and credible commitment to sound
macroeconomic management. However, when elections approach, stronger
pressures towards a more expansionary policy mix make it more di±cult for
governments to sustain a peg. The empirical evidence on the e®ect of elections
on the regime choice is limited. Bernhard and Leblang (1999) ¯nd that elec-
toral dummies are not statistically signi¯cant. Blomberg et al. (2004) support
the hypothesis that the probability of abandoning a peg increases in electoral
periods. Finally, Leblang (2002) ¯nds that the vulnerability of countries to
speculative attacks tends to increase in the upcoming of elections.
Government turnover and socio-political unrest. A high probability of ter-
mination and/or widespread socio-political unrest shift the focus of policymak-
ers towards short-term survival and increase uncertainty. This in turn reduces
the credibility of stabilisation policies. Therefore, the credibility view calls for
the adoption of a peg as a way to signal commitment, just like in the case of
electoral cycle. Conversely, the consistency view suggests that a °oat should
be adopted. The hypothesis that higher instability is associated with a °oat
has received some empirical support. Mµ eon and Rizzo (2002) report that the
5See the literature on exchange rate based stabilisations (Calvo and V¶ egh, 1999).
6See, among others, Dri±ll and Miller (1993).
7The result is limited only to the 1990s.
6average number of government changes in a political system is positively cor-
related with the probability of adopting a °exible arrangement. Berger et al.
(2000) focus on indicators of social unrest, such as the number of revolutions,
assassinations and strikes, and ¯nd that governments facing greater unrest
tend to adopt a °oat. However Poirson (2001) ¯nds no signi¯cant e®ects of
government changes on the exchange rate regime.
Institutional arrangements concerning the decision-making process. Insti-
tutional arrangements contribute to determining the veto-powers, checks and
balances, potential bottlenecks and stalemates that fragment the decision-
making process. Fragmentation requires more time and bargaining e®ort to
complete the decision-making process. Models of legislative bargaining (see
Baron (1991), Baron and Ferejohn (1989)) suggest that the need to achieve a
compromise among di®erent actors demands greater policy °exibility. More-
over fragmentation makes it more di±cult to reverse policy decisions, increas-
ing the option value of waiting before committing to a peg. These consider-
ations point to a °oat as the consistent regime choice when fragmentation is
high. The credibility view reverses this argument and calls for the adoption of
a nominal anchor as a tool to impose discipline on domestic political actors.
Empirical work on this ¯eld is relatively scarce. Leblang (1999) ¯nds that
in developing countries °exible exchange rates are associated with parliamen-
tary fractionalisation. Moving from the assumption that electoral rules are
the determinants of fragmentation, Bernhard and Leblang (1999) ¯nd that, in
industrialised countries, proportional systems are associated with pegs.
3 Methodology, data-set and variables
3.1 The empirical model
To perform our analysis, we use a large data-set covering economic and political
data for 160 countries from 1974 to 2000. Economic data are drawn from
standard sources (IMF and World Bank). Political data are taken mainly from
the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), the Cross-National Time-Series
Data Archive (CNTS), and Polity IV data set. The appendix provides a precise
description of data sources and variable construction. The de jure exchange
rate regimes classi¯cation is taken from IMF \Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions" (various years). Two alternative
classi¯cations exist for de facto regimes. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002)
adopt a statistical approach using cluster analysis on the volatility of exchange
rate and reserves. Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) use a \natural" classi¯cation
inferring the de facto regime from parallel market exchange rates. In this paper
7we use the latter classi¯cation, mainly because it avoids the use of unreliable
data on international reserves. Nevertheless, we test the sensitivity of our
results against the Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger's classi¯cation.
The choice of the estimation method requires some discussion. The use of
panel data estimator would be problematic. Using a random e®ect estimator
is not appropriate because we are investigating the almost entire population
of countries and the sample cannot be considered as drawn from a large dis-
tribution. This leaves the possibility of using a ¯xed e®ect estimator which
is, however, of little use in estimating variables that display limited variability
over time. As we mainly focus on political variables that typically have small
variations over time, we opted for the pooled OLS estimator.8 In doing so
we implicitly assume that all the individual heterogeneity is captured by our
political variables. In order to control for possible endogeneity, we lagged the
variables, when needed (see the appendix).
3.2 Model speci¯cation
The right hand side of our equation includes the variables discussed in the pre-
vious section. In addition, we include some controls. These represent economic
and political factors that, whilst not directly related to any of the two views,
still play a relevant role in the choice of exchange rate arrangements.
3.2.1 Variable de¯nition
Openness, size. OCA theories predict that the more open the economy is, the
greater the trade-enhancing e®ect of ¯xed exchange rates. It then follows that
there should be a positive association between openness to international trade
and the propensity to peg. Yet, more open economies are more exposed to
external shocks, and therefore bene¯t from exchange rate °exibility. Moreover
the economic size of a country should negatively a®ect the likelihood of pegging
as larger economies are generally more closed. Finally, fear of °oating theo-
ries (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) point to exchange rate volatility as a channel
through which more open economies import price volatility (depending on the
degree of pass through). In this case, countries might adopt a ¯xed exchange
rate to shut down this channel of volatility. We measure trade openness as im-
ports + exports /2GDP (open). Economic size is de¯ned as the ratio between
the country GDP to US GDP (sizetous).
Trade concentration and economic volatility. Trade concentration exposes
countries to external shocks and should therefore reduce the likelihood of ob-
8We included in the regression time dummies that are not reported in the tables for
reasons of space.
8serving a peg. Moreover one would expect indicators of economic volatility
to be negatively related with the propensity to peg, because °exible exchange
rates can be used to stabilise the economy. Trade concentration is measured
as the share of export to the 3 largest partners (shrtrade3). We use two mea-
sures of economic volatility: volatility of investment over GDP (vigdp), and
volatility of government expenditure over GDP (vltgovexpgdp). Both measures
proxy volatility by the standard deviation over time of the two variables.9
Financial development. Financially developed economies are expected to
have more di±culties in keeping the exchange rate ¯xed (Obstfeld and Taylor,
2004). Fear of °oating theories claim that more developed economies show
greater ability to °oat (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Following the correlation
between ¯nancial and economic development, ¯nancial depth should reduce the
propensity to peg. A related argument is that capital account openness should
be associated with a °oat, as high capital mobility makes it is more di±cult to
maintain a peg. We proxy ¯nancial development with the ratio of quasi money
over money (qmm1). As for capital account openness (kaopen), we employ two
indicators: the ¯rst is constructed extracting the principal component from
indicators derived from the IMF \Exchange rate restrictions", following the
methodology by Chinn and Ito (2002); the second is a dummy taking value of
1 if capital account restrictions are present.
Liability dollarisation. We proxy it with the ratio of foreign liabilities over
money (°2m1).
In°ation. We consider the lagged rate of in°ation measured as a three year
moving average (avin°). We also control for high in°ation countries with a
dummy (din°) taking value 1 when the annual rate of in°ation is above 40%.10
Electoral cycle. The dummy variable legelec takes value 1 in electoral years
and zero otherwise (Source DPI). The dummy is coded considering legislative
elections. However, re-coding it to include also executive elections does not
produce any change in the results.
Government turnover and socio-political instability. We use two indicators.
The ¯rst one is the incumbent's tenure in o±ce, (yearso®c; source DPI). As
discussed by the government stability literature, longer tenure in o±ce tends to
be associated with a higher probability of observing a government change in the
near future (Carmignani, 2002). Thus, higher values of yearso®c denote higher
expected government turnover. The literature measures government turnover
also with the average number of government terminations in a given period or
9In the baseline speci¯cation we will use only vigdp, since vltgovexpgdp is available only
for a smaller sub-set of relatively richer countries.
10This is the standard World Bank de¯nition of high in°ation. For theoretical and em-
pirical underpinnings of this threshold see Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) and Bruno and
Easterly (1998).
9with a dummy picking years of actual government change. We prefer yearso®c
because it is better suited to capture the expectation of a change and hence
the associated degree of uncertainty, which drives the political channel. The
second indicator is an aggregate index of socio-political instability, (sprisk2;
source CNTS). This is obtained as the principal component of several indicators
of social instability: assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, purges,
riots, revolutions, anti-government demonstrations.
Institutional arrangements. The variable pcapol measures the checks and
balances incorporated in the institutional system (source DPI, Polity IV).
Higher values correspond to a situation where reversing policy changes is more
di±cult because either the government or the president have loser control over
the decision making process. Technically, the index is obtained as the princi-
pal component of three measures quantifying the number of veto players and
hurdles in decision rules (see the appendix for more details). Persson and
Tabellini (2004) point out that also constitutional rules contribute to shaping
political bargaining and hence economic policy outcomes. We capture these ef-
fects through a second institutional variable, system, which isolates three main
typologies of political regimes: parliamentary, assembly-elected and presiden-
tial (source: DPI). In our interpretation, higher values of system correspond
to more fragmented political processes.
Ideological preferences. The partisan business cycle literature11 claims that
right-wing governments should be more conservative in the use of macroeco-
nomic policy as a coutercyclical tool. In this respect, ideology could a®ect the
degree of discretion that governments are willing to retain over macroeconomic
policy and hence the choice of the exchange rate regime. We therefore include
the policymaker's ideological preferences as an additional control. The dummy
variable d right takes value 1 when the incumbent has a right-wing ideological
orientation and zero otherwise (source DPI).12
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, and table 2 shows the pairwise cor-
relations that are reassuringly low.
4 Econometric results
The empirical analysis is composed of two parts. First, we look at how political
and economic variables a®ect the likelihood of observing de facto or de jure
pegs. Second, we investigate which political and economic factors are corre-
11The literature on this argument is vast; for an up to date survey see Persson and Tabellini
(2001).
12Following the literature in this area, the dummy is coded from country's information on
the location of governments/parties on a left-right policy scale.
10lated to the observed di®erences between de jure and de facto regimes. This
basically amounts to investigating the determinants of broken promises.
4.1 The choice of the exchange rate regime
Table 3 reports the results for the baseline regression. The dependent variable
is coded 1 for de facto regimes.
Openness, size, trade concentration and economic volatility indicators. A
country is less likely to adopt a ¯xed exchange rate if it is relatively large and
closed, if its external trade is concentrated, and if the business cycle is more
volatile. This suggests that what matters for the choice of the exchange rate
regime is the exposure to external shocks.
Financial depth indicators. In contrast with conventional wisdom (i.e. the
impossible trinity theorem), the capital account openness indicator (kaopen)
is positively related to the propensity to peg.13 The interpretation of this
result crucially lies in the di®erence between de jure and de facto regimes;
we will discuss this issue more thoroughly below. Domestic ¯nancial market
depth (qmm1) lowers the chances that the country pegs. This con¯rms the
view that sustaining a peg is less likely when ¯nancial markets are relatively
sophisticated.
Liability dollarisation. The positive and highly signi¯cant coe±cient for
°m1 suggests that the higher risk of an adverse balance sheet e®ect makes
countries more reluctant to °oat.
In°ation. Neither variable is signi¯cant. However, in°ation is always signif-
icant when we run the regression without socio-political variables, suggesting
that the in°ation rate is to some extent endogenous to the institutional and
political environment.
Political variables. Expected government turnover (yrso®c) and socio-
political unrest (sprisk2) reduce the likelihood of adopting a de facto peg.
The negative coe±cient on legelec indicates that governments value discretion
in the upcoming of elections. Institutional arrangements are also statistically
signi¯cant. Both coe±cients on pcapol and system are negative. Thus more
fragmented policymaking calls for a °oat as greater discretion makes it eas-
ier to settle con°icts among agents involved in the decision-making process.
Finally the non signi¯cance of d right suggests that political determinants of
exchange rate regime choice are fundamentally non ideological.
Table 4 presents results for the baseline regression with the o±cial de jure
classi¯cation. There are indeed striking di®erences between de jure and the
13The result is robust to changes in the speci¯cation: we have in fact substituted kaopen
with a dummy that identify capital controls (taken from Ghosh et al. (2002)) getting a
negative and highly signi¯cant coe±cient.
11de facto regressions. Some variables loose signi¯cance, while others, notably
°2m1 yrso®c, system, change sign. Such a sharp di®erence calls for a deeper
investigation. Bearing in mind that, relatively to the variable \de facto pegs",
the variable \de jure pegs" excludes non announced de facto pegs and in-
cludes de jure pegs that are not implemented in practice, in what follows we
investigate the reasons why:
² only a subset of those who implement a de facto peg, also publicly an-
nounce it.
² a country announces a peg and actually implements it.
² a promise to either °oat or peg is broken.
4.2 Why do countries announce and implement a peg?
In tables 5 and 6 we analyse the probability that a de facto peg is also an-
nounced. We therefore restrict the sample to include only countries with a
de facto peg and code the dependent variable as 1 for de jure pegs. Since the
theoretical underpinnings of exchange rate regime choice do not provide an im-
mediate interpretation for this observed behaviour, in addition to the baseline
equation (table 5) we also estimate a best equation (table 6). This is obtained
by recursive elimination of variables that add insigni¯cant explanatory power
to the model.
Among the de facto peggers, the chances that the regime is announced
increase if countries are relatively small, have a lower liability dollarisation,
are less prone to social political risk, have an upcoming election and a less
fragmented political system.
Relatively to table 3 we note a sign reversal for two key variables: °2m1
and legelec. With regard to liability dollarisation this result proves that higher
risk of an adverse balance sheet e®ect induce countries to prefer a peg, but
also to fear a public commitment to it. With regard to legelec we know from
the previous paragraph that, with upcoming elections, governments generally
prefer °oating as this gives them more freedom in the discretionary use of
economic policy for electoral purposes. However, if for other reasons a peg
is already established de facto, then governments will have an incentive to
announce it in order to reap the bene¯ts from signalling their commitment.
Greater political uncertainty and a more fragmented decision making sys-
tem (sprisk2, pcapol, system) make it less likely to announce a peg even if the
country is already adopting it de facto. In fact, the fragmentation of policy-
making makes it more di±cult to revert previously made decisions. In this
12sense, governments that do not want to tie their hands might decide not to
make announcements about pegging the exchange rate.
To complete the evidence, we also estimate a model on the full sample
de¯ning the dependent variable as 1 if a country has both a de jure and a
de facto peg. Table 7 reports the results for the baseline speci¯cation. These
con¯rm our previous ¯ndings. There is however the striking anomaly of foreign
liabilities (°2m1). It seems that countries are weary of publicly committing
to a peg if they are at risk of a balance sheet e®ect in case of devaluation.
In the light of the controversy between consistency and credibility, the
results obtained so far unambiguously support the consistency view. The case
of foreign liabilities dollarisation is illuminating; in fact the risk of an adverse
balance sheet e®ect makes countries weary of exchange rate °exibility, but also
more reluctant to publicly commit to a peg. Moreover indicators of political
instability and ine±ciency show that unstable countries are reluctant to both
adopt and commit to an exchange rate peg.
4.3 Broken promises
This section looks at how political factors a®ect the likelihood that a gov-
ernment will announce a regime and then follow a di®erent one, that is we
study the determinants of broken promises. Again, since we do not have an
immediate theoretical interpretation, we estimate best equations in addition
to baseline equations. In the following we will comment only best equation
results.
4.3.1 Broken ¯x
First, we consider broken ¯x promises, that is countries announcing a de jure
¯x and following de facto another regime (Tables 8 and 9).
Devaluations are more costly when economies are open, as imported in°a-
tion becomes relatively more important, and have a high share of dollarised
liabilities, as the adverse balance sheet e®ect is stronger. In fact the probability
to break a peg decreases with open and °2m1.
The indicator of capital account openness (kaopen) has a negative and sig-
ni¯cant sign. Taking into account the results presented in tables 3 and 7 we
¯nd that countries with highly integrated capital markets are more likely to
adopt a peg and to publicly commit to it, and less likely to renege on their
commitment. This could be explained by the attempt of many non indus-
trialised countries to attract capital °ows by integrating in the international
¯nancial markets and using a peg to stabilise expectations.
13Turning to political variables, the coe±cient on government turnover, socio-
political unrest, and decision-making fragmentation are positive. In line with
the consistency view governments who are subject to an adverse political en-
vironment ¯nd it more di±cult to sustain the commitment to a peg.
Di®erently from the baseline equation the policymaker's ideology now mat-
ters: the d right coe±cient is negative. Even though right-wing governments
do not exhibit any systematic regime preference, their relative concern for the
in°ationary consequences of a devaluation makes them less likely to renege.
4.3.2 Broken °ex
We now consider broken promises among countries that are de jure °exible.
The dependent variable broken°ex is essentially a dummy for fear of °oating.
Tables 10 and 11 show the results for the baseline and best equations.
More open economies fear a °oat as for them volatility is costly; however
external trade concentration strengthens commitment to a °oat as the economy
is more exposed to asymmetric shocks.14 Dollarised countries are more likely
to display fear of °oating con¯rming the ¯ndings of Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
Turning to politics, governments facing socio-politically unstable conditions
fear °oating, as denoted by the positive coe±cient on sprisk2. Taking into
account the results in table 9, we ¯nd that social instability unambiguously
raises the chances that a promise is broken, con¯rming the intuition that under
these circumstances it is more di±cult for governments to stick to an announced
course of action. The coe±cient on yrso®c is negative reversing the result
obtained in table 9, con¯rming the argument that a greater probability of
termination induces government to implement discretionary policies. Finally
right-wing governments are more likely to renege on the promises to °oat
(positive coe±cient on d right); again this is consistent with the greater weight
these governments attach to in°ation stabilisation.
4.4 Robustness checks
Our results survived a number of robustness checks.
First we have de¯ned the dependent variable as a trichotomous variable that
identi¯es ¯xed, intermediate and °oating exchange rate regimes (the variable
is ordered with increasing degree of ¯xity). This allowed us to estimate an
ordered logit model. Table 12 presents the results of the baseline regression for
an ordered logit. Economic controls yield the same results as under the baseline
regression. However the high in°ation dummy has a reversed sign. Taking into
14These results are con¯rmed by our baseline regression where the two coe±cient enter
with the opposite sign.
14account the baseline results, this suggests that high in°ation countries either
choose a (falling) °exible exchange rate, or choose to peg the rate in order to
stabilise it. The signs on political variables are con¯rmed but yrso®c looses
signi¯cance.
Second we split the sample in two subperiods distinguishing between eight-
ies and nineties. Again the results are broadly co¯rmed, even though the
marginal impact of political variables in the '90s tends to be smaller than in
the '80s. This could suggests that the strength of the link between politics and
exchange rate regimes decreased over time. Alternatively, the di®erence be-
tween the two decades could be due to a composition e®ect. In fact, our sample
in the nineties includes several transition economies that are not present in the
eighties. Further investigation on this issue is certainly an interesting avenue
of future research.
Third, in table 13 we present the results of the baseline regression where we
have also included a variable representing the volatility of government expen-
diture to GDP ratio (vltgovexpgdp). This adds some explanatory power to the
model but at the cost of a signi¯cant loss in observations (almost 1/3 in the
baseline regression). In fact, vltgovexpgdp is available only for a smaller group
of relatively richer countries and this is the reason why we decide not to in-
clude in the baseline model.15 The main di®erence with respect to the baseline
regression is that both in°ation variables become signi¯cant with the expected
sign (negative for avin° and positive for the dummy for high in°ation).
Fourth we have estimated the baseline model with Levy-Yeyati and Sturzeneg-
ger's (LYS) de facto. We obtain results which are di®erent from table 3 and
very similar to our results for de jure pegs (table 4). This is because the LYS
and IMF classi¯cations are relatively close. In more than 2/3 of the cases the
two classi¯cations are identical and when we pass from a trichotomous to a
dichotomous classi¯cation (that is when we consider a dummy taking value
of 1 for a de facto peg and 0 otherwise) the mismatch is reduced to 20%.
This would cast doubts on the reliability of estimates when investigating sub
regimes. On the other hand the Reinhart Rogo®'s classi¯cation does not suf-
fer from these problems as it o®ers more observations when investigating the
di®erences between de jure and de facto regimes.
15Note that the volatility of government expenditure over GDP (see below table 13) is
positively related with the likelihood of pegging. If the volatility of ¯scal policy re°ects
the volatility of the business cycle, then this result contrast with volatility of investment.
A possible interpretation is that countries that use the ¯scal tool more heavily have a less
stringent need for monetary stabilisation hence they are more likely to de facto peg. This
explanation however is partially opposed by Kaminsky et al. (2004) who show that emerging
countries often use ¯scal policy procyclically. Further research on this issue is certainly
needed.
155 Concluding remarks
In this paper we show that the exchange rate regime is chosen consistently
with a set of underlying economic and socio-political conditions. In particular
socio-political variables explain not only the regime choice, but also why some
regimes are announced and why they are either sustained thereafter or reneged
upon.
This should not come as a surprise: political economy models have taught
us that government's preferences and political incentives are crucial in shaping
macroeconomic policies. The empirical evidence presented in this paper chal-
lenges the standard view that sees the exchange rate as a commitment device.
In choosing the exchange rate regime, policymakers seem to be concerned with
the sustainability of the regime. This is a wise approach as adverse economic
and socio political fundamentals raise the chances that regime choices will be
reversed.
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20Appendix
Table 1: Descriptive stats: all countries
Var. Mean SD. Dev Min 25 50 75 Max N.Obs.
avin° 0.17 0.35 -0.20 0.04 0.09 0.15 4.28 3719
°2m1 0.86 1.06 0.02 0.22 0.50 1.06 7.23 3472
kaopen 0.01 1.52 -1.79 -1.09 -0.06 1.25 2.66 3478
legelec 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4236
open 0.39 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.33 0.51 1.39 4354
pcapol 0.00 1.37 -3.78 -1.06 -0.79 1.31 6.97 3658
qmm1 1.50 1.18 0.08 0.54 1.17 2.25 5.61 3918
shrtrade3 0.51 0.14 0.26 0.40 0.49 0.61 0.87 3302
sizetous 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 4384
sprisk2 0.01 1.49 -0.72 -0.72 -0.72 0.21 17.02 4475
system 0.80 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 4078
vigdp 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10 3863
vltgovexgdp 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10 2428


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Table 3: Baseline regression
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
sizetous ¡2:998¤¤¤ (0.593)
open l 1:342¤¤¤ (0.453)
shrtrade3 l ¡1:323¤¤ (0.530)
vigdp ¡11:783¤¤ (4.964)
°2m1 l 0:328¤¤¤ (0.080)


















Dep. Var: 1 if de facto ¯x
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
23Table 4: Baseline de jure
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
sizetous ¡18:790¤¤¤ (4.181)
open l 0:204 (0.462)
shrtrade3 l ¡0:046 (0.444)
vigdp 3:792 (3.996)
°2m1 l ¡0:391¤¤¤ (0.078)


















Dep. Var: 1 if de jure ¯x.
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
24Table 5: De jure ¯x among those who have a de facto ¯x
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
sizetous ¡20:436¤¤ (10.108)
open l 0:431 (1.174)
shrtrade3 l 1:143 (1.548)
vigdp ¡0:637 (11.196)
°2m1 l ¡0:455¤¤¤ (0.157)

















Sample: countries with de facto ¯x
Dep. Var: 1 if de jure ¯x
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
25Table 6: De jure among de facto, best equation
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
sizetous ¡19:930¤¤ (8.729)












Sample: countries with de facto ¯x
Dep. Var: 1 if de jure ¯x
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
26Table 7: De jure and de facto
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
sizetous ¡10:362¤¤ (4.308)
open l 1:015¤¤ (0.504)
shrtrade3 l ¡1:305¤¤ (0.574)
vigdp ¡5:368 (4.922)
°2m1 l ¡0:037 (0.080)


















Dep. Var: 1 if de facto and de jure ¯x
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
27Table 8: Broken promises among de jure ¯x
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
sizetous ¡7:460 (9.593)
open l ¡1:243 (0.839)
shrtrade3 l ¡0:426 (0.745)
vigdp 15:695¤¤ (7.688)
°2m1 l ¡0:704¤¤¤ (0.204)

















Sample: countries who have a de jure ¯x
Dep. Var: 1 if de facto regime is not a ¯x
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
28Table 9: Broken promises among de jure ¯x: best equation
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
open l ¡2:182¤¤¤ (0.450)
°2m1 l ¡0:196¤ (0.115)
qmm1 l 0:270¤¤¤ (0.090)
kaopen ¡0:873¤¤¤ (0.102)











Sample: countries who have a de jure ¯x
Dep. Var: 1 if de facto regime is not a ¯x
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
29Table 10: Broken promises among de jure °ex
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
sizetous ¡3:964¤¤¤ (1.114)
open l 10:380¤¤ (4.055)
shrtrade3 l ¡6:896¤¤¤ (2.434)
vigdp 19:701 (20.452)
°2m1 l 0:424¤¤ (0.210)

















Sample: countries who have a de jure °ex
Dep. Var: 1 if de facto regime is not a °ex
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
30Table 11: Broken promises among de jure °ex: best equation
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
sizetous ¡3:675¤¤¤ (0.849)
open l 7:537¤¤¤ (2.456)
shrtrade3 l ¡3:890¤¤ (1.695)
°2m1 l 0:403¤¤ (0.200)










Sample: countries who have a de jure °ex
Dep. Var: 1 if de facto regime is not a °ex
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
31Table 12: Baseline ordered logit
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
sizetous ¡4:559¤¤¤ (0.541)
open l 2:064¤¤¤ (0.435)
shrtrade3 l ¡1:116¤¤ (0.453)
vigdp ¡15:763¤¤¤ (4.479)
°2m1 l 0:144¤¤ (0.071)



















Dep. Var: de facto regime: 1 °ex, 2 if intermediate, 3 if ¯x
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
32Table 13: Baseline regression with govexp
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
sizetous ¡2:869¤¤¤ (0.596)
open l 1:752¤¤¤ (0.580)
shrtrade3 l ¡1:836¤¤¤ (0.662)
vltgovexgdp 14:138¤¤¤ (4.911)
vigdp ¡22:333¤¤¤ (8.010)
°2m1 l 0:320¤¤¤ (0.086)


















Dep. Var: 1 if de facto ¯x
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
33Table 14: Baseline eighties
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
sizetous ¡4:965¤ (2.790)
open l 2:469¤¤ (1.050)
shrtrade3 l ¡1:338 (0.965)
vigdp ¡25:104¤¤ (11.216)
°2m1 l 0:542¤¤¤ (0.144)

















Sample: all countries, 1980s
Dep. Var: 1 if de facto ¯x
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
34Table 15: Baseline nineties
Variable Coe±cient (Std. Err.)
sizetous ¡2:409¤¤¤ (0.768)
open l ¡0:453 (0.649)
shrtrade3 l ¡0:604 (0.756)
vigdp ¡15:800¤ (8.218)
°2m1 l 0:418¤¤¤ (0.120)

















Sample: all countries, 1990s
Dep. Var: 1 if de facto ¯x
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
35Economic Variables
Variable Description Source
avin° average in°ation, 3
years moving average
IFS line 64
din°2 dummy for high in-
°ation countries (in°a-
tion rate above 40% per
year)
IFS
M1 money IFS line 34
°2m1 Foreign liabilities over
money (lagged)
IFS line 16c + line 26c
kaopen capital account openess
index
authors' calculation
based on Chinn and Ito
(2001)
open openess (lagged), im-
ports + exports/2gdp
WDI
qmm1 quasi money over
money (lagged)
IFS, line 35/line 34
shrtrade3 share of trade with the
3 largest export part-
ners (lagged)
IMF DTS
sizetous gdp as a share of US
gdp
WDI
vigdp volatility of investment
over gdp, 3 years mov-
ing standard deviation
IFS, line 93e / line 99b
vltgovexgdp volatility of government
expenditure over gdp, 3
years moving standard
deviation
IFS, line 82 / line 99b
36Political Variables
Variable Description Source




system Typology of political
system
DPI
Ass Assassinations CNTS archive
Genstr General Strikes CNTS archive
Guerwar Guerrilla Warfare CNTS archive
Purg Purges CNTS archive
Riots Riots CNTS archive




sprisk2 index of socio political
risk, ¯rst principal com-




dright dummy for right wing
governments
DPI and authors' calcu-
lations
legelec dummy for legislative
election





polconv A New Measure of
Credible Commitment
source: Witold Henisz
checks Number of veto players DPI
pcapol index of political risk:
¯rst principal com-
ponent over xconst,
checks, polconv
Authors' calculations
37